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defenses available to other parties to a negotiable instrument would tend
to suppress this class of paper and cripple business transactions.
Having once decided that a purchaser for value must also be a holder
in due course, the court had no difficulty in holding that the bank could
not recover, since the note in suit was a renewal of the original notes
executed by appellee Myers, and the bank would take the renewal note
subject to the same defenses as the original notes.
Undoubtedly the principal case is correct both on principle and au-
thority,8 and is an excellent example of thorough analysis and application
of all the pertinent sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A. A. C.
HABruAL CRIMINAL AcT-CoNsTITuTIoNALITY-EvMDENCE-Defendant
was charged by a grand jury indictment with assault and battery with
intent to kill and with being an habitual criminal, as provided by the
Indiana Statutes. There was a verdict of guilty of the crime of assault
and battery with intent to kill as charged and a finding that the defendant
had been convicted of a felony, on two previous occasions, and imprisoned
for the offenses committed. The court sentenced the defendant to the
state prison for life as an habitual criminal. Defendant appealed, assign-
ing as error the introduction of evidence in proof of the prior convictions
as prejudicial, and attacking the constitutionality of the Habitual Crimi-
nal Act, claiming it to be a denial of the equal protection of the law. The
verdict of the trial court was affirmed.1
The Indiana Habitual Criminal Act2 is in accordance with the general
legislative thought throughout the country, practically every state having
a similar statute.3 Although the Act has been in effect in Indiana since
1907, yet its punishment has seldom been invoked, the convictions under
itf-averaging one a year.4 The writer thinks this is not due to the amount
of data available for identification but to the failure of the public officials
to use that which is available;5 IndianaO and the Federal Department of
Justice7 both maintaining bureaus of identification. And further, the
present undeveloped status of our criminal identification constitutes a
a Pacific-Southwest Trust and Savings Bank v. Valley Finance Corporation
(1929), 99 Cal. App. 728, 279 Pac. 222; Weiser National Bank v. Peters (1927),
174 Ark. 984, 298 S. W. 878; Bartels v. Suther (1928), 130 Okla. 7, 266 Pac. 753;
Wilholt v. Seavall (1926), 121 Kan. 239, 246 Pac. 1013; (1924) 24 Col. Law
Rev. 791.
'Barr v. State (1933), 187 N. E. 259 (Ind.).2 Burns' Ann. Stat. (1926), 2339, 2340.
$Oregon Laws (1921), c. 70; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington 1922), § 2286;
W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes 1923), c. 152, § 24; N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Supp. 1926),
c. 41, §§ 1942-3; Cal. St. 1927, p. 1066 (amending see. 644 Penal Code) ; Iowa Sec-
tion 1964 (1) of Code of 1924; Conn. Indeterminate Sentence Act (Gen. St. 1918,
§ 6660); Ohio Laws 82, 237; MJnn. section 4772, R. L. 1905; Ill. Laws 1883, p. 76;
Okla. Laws 1911, c. 70; Mass. St. 1887, c. 435; Missouri Rev. St. 1909, c. 4913.
'Report of Indiana Committee on Observance and Enforcement of Law, Jan-
uary 5, 1931.
5Frank 0. Lowden, Criminal Statistics and Identification of Criminals, 19
Journal of Criminal Law 36.
$Burns' Ann. Stat. 1929, Supp. 2409, 1-2409.12.
7United States Code Ann. 5:300.
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serious obstacle to police efficiency.8 This problem can be partially solved
by the contribution, by local officials, of the data which they have at hand
to the centralized bureaus and the use by local officials of the data collected
by such bureaus.
The constitutionality of statutes enhancing the punishment for a second
or subsequent offense has been repeatedly attacked but in all instances, the
courts have upheld them.
First, it is contended that such statutes deny the equal protection of the
law. This constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes under like circum-
stances.9 Thus, a state may undoubtedly provide that persons who have
been before convicted of a crime suffer severer punishment for such subse-
quent offenses than for a first offense, provided, it is dealt out to all alike,
who are similarly situated.1 0
Secondly, it is contended that such statutes are unconstitutional as put-
ting the accused twice in jeopardy of life or liberty. But the increased
severity of the punishment is not a punishment for a prior offense a second
time, but is a severer punishment for the present offense, due to the
incorrigible and dangerous character of the accused, as evidenced by the
prior convictions. And it has been deemed advisable by the legislatures
that one who has such criminal traits should be more severely punished
than the first offender.' 1
Third, it is said that such statutes are unconstitutional as providing
an unusual and cruel punishment. But this too is fallacious, as the word
"cruel," as used in the amendatory article of the Constitution, was in-
tended to prohibit a resort to punishment by torture, such as burning
and mutilation of the body, and was not intended to abridge the selection,
sJohn Edgar Hoover, Criminal Identification, June 21, 1933. Mr. Hoover says:
"Criminal identification is indispensable in combating crime. It is the most potent
factor in obtaining the apprehension of the fugitive who might otherwise escape
arrest and continue his criminal activities indefinitely. * * * Generally, the
first offender can be distinguished from the recidivist or habitual criminal only
through the medium of scientific criminal identification." Mr. Hoover, who is the
director of the United States Bureau of Investigation, further states in his article,
"All peace officers are invited to avail themselves of the information contained in
the files of the United States Bureau of Investigation. Its service is rendered to
all legally constituted law enforcement agencies free of cost."
9Missouri v. Lewis (1879), 101 U. S. 22.
"0McDonald v. Massachusetts (1901), 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389;
Moore v. Missouri (1895), 159 U. S. 673, 16 Sup. CL Rep. 179; McDonald v. Com-
monwealth (1899), 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874; Commonwealth v. Graves (1892),
155 Mass. 163; State v. Hodgson (1893), 66 Vt. 134, 28 AtU. 1089; Sturtenant v.
Commonwealth (1893), 158 Mass. 598; Graham v. West Virginia (1912), 224 U. 8.
616, 32 Sup. CL Rep. 583.
1 State v. Moore (1894), 121 Mo. 514, 26 S. W. 345; State v. Findling (1913),
123 Minn. 413, 144 N. W. 142; McDonald v. Massachusetts (1901), 180 U. S. 311,
21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Kelly v. People (1886), 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644; Ingalls v.
State (1880), 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785; People v. McCarthy (N. Y. 1873), 45 How.
Pr. 97; People v. Coleman (1904), 145 Cal. 609, 79 Pac. 283; Carlesl v. New York
(1914), 233 U. S. 51, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; State v. La Pitre (1909), 54 Wash. 166,
103 Pac. 27; People v. Sickles (1898), 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288; Goeller v.
state (1912), 119 Md. 61, 85 Atl. 954.
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by the legislature, of the duration of time that a convicted criminal is to
spend in penitentiary confinement.12
Fourth, the accused contends that the statute can only be applied to
cases, in which the former convictions on which punishment is imposed,
are subsequent to the passage of the act, and that if the prior offenses
occurred before the statute was enacted, the statute is an ex post facto
law and therefore unconstitutional. But the prior convictions are in no
sense an element of the present offense. They are simply facts which must
be taken into consideration in fixing punishment for the present offense,
which is committed after the passage of the act. In other words, the
statute imposes one punishment for ordinary offenders and a more severe
punishment for incorrigible offenders, evidenced by the previous criminal
conduct.13
Lastly, it is said that a statute, which enhances the punishment for an
offense where there have been prior convictions, no matter whether such
prior convictions have been in the state of the forum or not, is unconsti-
tutional as imposing a penalty for crimes committed outside of the juris-
diction. But this contention is unfounded as neither the trial nor the
punishment are for the prior offenses, but for the principal offense charged
and the punishment is merely made more severe because of the previous
criminal conduct of the accused.14
To authorize a conviction under the Indiana statutes, it is necessary
that the affidavit shall allege that the defendant has been previously con-
victed, sentenced, and imprisoned in some penal institution for felonies,
describing each separately.15 This is necessary in order to give the de-
fendant an opportunity to plead his defense thereto. And if there is no
such allegation in the indictment, a judgment, imposing a punishment
greater than imposed for a first offense, is erroneous.16
It seems, however, that the procedure, affirmed by the court in this
case, is not desirable and consonant with justice to the defendant. As
was said by Burpee J. in a Connecticut case,17 "Two separate issues are
presented: first, was the defendant guilty of the crime charged? This
relates to the crime only. Second, if guilty, had the defendant twice been
12People v. Stankey (1873), 47 Cal. 113; State v. Dowden (1908), 137 Iowa
573, 115 N. W. 211; Gibson v. Commonwealth (1924), 204 Ky. 748, 265 S. W.
339; McDonald v. Commonwealth (1899), 173 Mass. 322, 52 N. E. 874; Kelly v.
People (1886), 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644; State ex rel. Larabee v. Barnes (1893),
3 N. D. 319, 55 N. W. 883; People v. Morris (1890), 80 Mich. 634; State v. La
Pitre (1909), 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27.
l3 Jones v. State (1913), 9 Okla. Cr. 646, 133 Pac. 249; Commonwealth v.
Graves (1891), 185 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579; State v. Collins (1915), 266 Mo. 93,
180 S. W. 866; State v. Zywicki (1928), 175 Minn. 508, 221 N. W. 900; State v.
Norris (1926), 203 Iowa 464, 210 N. W. 922; State v. Adams (1913), 89 Kans. 674,
132 Pac. 171; Blackburn v. State (1873), 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18; Iowa ex
rel. Gregory v. Jones (1904), D. C. 128 Fed. 626.
',McDonald v. Commonwealth (1899), 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874, affirmed
in (1901) 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup. CL Rep. 389; State v. La Pitre (1909), 54 Wash.
166, 103 Pac. 27.
l5Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926, Sec. 2340.
"Dalrymple v. State, 5 Ohio C. C. N. S. 185; State v. Davidson (1899), 124
N. C. 839, 32 S. E. 957; Brandy v. Hehn (1902), 10 Wyo. 167, 67 Pac. 979.
2 State v. Perrone (1921), 96 Conn. 160, 113 Ati. 452.
RECENT CASE NOTES
convicted, sentenced and imprisoned? This relates to the penalty only and
does not involve or state any other or different crime from the first stated.
The jury must by their verdict answer each of these issues. This plainly
indicates that the first issue should be taken up and tried by the jury first
and separately; and, if the accused be found guilty on this issue, then the
second issue should be tried; and if the accused be found guilty on this
issue, also, then the maximum punishment prescribed by the statute must
be the sentence of the court. It cannot be believed that an accused man
would ever have a fair trial, resulting in a verdict not affected by preju-
dice or by considerations by which the jury should not be influenced, if
during the trial, allegations, that he has twice before been convicted of
state prison crimes, have been read to the jury, and evidence of his former
convictions have been placed before them. The purpose of a criminal trial
in this state is not more to punish the guilty than to discharge the inno-
cent, and a man is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is
guilty of another."
The following procedure to be followed by the trial courts seems
applicable to bring about a fairer result. The indictment should be
divided into two parts. In the first, the particular offense with which the
accused is charged should be set forth, and in the second, the former
convictions should be alleged. The entire indictment should be read to the
defendant and his plea taken in the absence of the jurors. When the jury
has been impaneled and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that
part of the indictment which sets forth the crime, for which the accused
is to be tried. And during the trial, no reference should be made to the
jury as to the former convictions, unless the defendant has taken the
stand and thereby led to the introduction of such evidence. When the
jury retires to consider their verdict, only the first part of the indictment
should be given to them. If they return a verdict of guilty, the second
part of the indictment, in which the former convictions are alleged, should
be read to them without reswearing them. Evidence of such former con-
victions then should be given to the jury and at the conclusion of this
evidence, the jury can retire and find on this issue. Such a procedure is
so desirable that it has been adopted by statute in two jurisdictions.18
But there is no reason why such a result could not be reached without a
statute.19
The Indiana Court says, however, "Such evidence may be prejudicial
to a defendant as to a second or subsequent offense, and a case might occur
of a conviction upon too slight evidence, through the influence which a
previous conviction might exert upon the minds of the jury; but there is
no legal presumption that such a result will ever be produced."20 How
can the court in this specific instance say that the evidence of former
18England: 6 and 7 Win. IV Chap. 11; Wash. Rem. and Bal. Code 1903,
Ch. 2174.
29 State v. Ferrone (1921), 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452; Reg v. Woodfleld (Eng.
1887), 16 Cox C. C. 314 (not covered by the statute); Graham v. West Virginia
(1912), 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S. E. 1010; McWhorter v. State (1903), 118 Ga. 55, 44
S. E. 873; McDonald v. Massachusetts (1901), 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389
(here by mistake).
20Barr v. State (1933), 187 N. E. 259 at page 262.
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convictions is not presumed to be prejudicial when for over a hundred
years, this same court in all other criminal cases has held such evidence
to be prejudicial and its introduction reversible error,1 unless it shows
intent or motive or is used to impeach the credibility of the defendant,
-when he takes the witness stand?21
Also, there is some feeling that statutes enhancing the punishment for
a second or subsequent offense impose a too severe punishment upon the
accused, and due to the fear of locked juries, many prosecutors are apt
to refrain from bringing indictments under such a statute. With the pro-
cedure herein set out, there is less likelihood of a disagreement among the
jurymen for that reason as they will have no knowledge of the indictment
under the Habitual Criminal Act until they have returned a verdict as to
the crime charged in the instant case.
In conclusion, it seems that the present status of criminal activity
demands the more frequent application of the Habitual Criminal Act, in
order to protect society from the continuous depredations of confirmed
criminals. Also, in order to give protection to a reformed criminal, the
procedure set forth herein seems more in line with such an objective.
S. E. M.
PARTY WALLS-WHAT CoNsTITuTEs A USE-UsE By LEssEE or NON-
BuiLDER-Plaintiff and defendant were adjoining landowners, and they
entered into an agreement whereby the defendant permitted the plaintiff
to "extend" a party wall eight inches in width on the defendant's side of
the property line, and whereby the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff
one-half of the value of said wall whenever the defendant, his successors
or assigns, desired to use the same. The agreement stipulated that the
defendant acquired "the right to use said wall-as a party wall." Plaintiff
erected the wall, and at the time of erection and continuously thereafter,
defendant's adjoining premises were in the possession of a tenant. This
tenant built a frame garage about twenty-four feet wide and twenty-four
feet long, supported by posts which rested on brick piers built on the
ground. The party wall formed one of the walls of the garage, and the
paper roofing of the garage was attached to the wall, this being, however,
the only point of connection between the garage and the wall. Plaintiff
contended that this was such a use as to make the defendant liable to
contribute one-half the value of the party wall. Trial was had by the
court, without a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. Motion
for a new trial was filed and overruled. Plaintiff appealed. Held, that
construction of a garage so that a party wall formed one of its walls
attached to remainder of garage only by roofing paper is not such a use as
to render adjoining landowner liable for contribution under a party wall
agreement; and that the tenant's unauthorized use of a party wall could
-Dunn v. State (1903), 162 ind. 174, 70 N. E. 521; Pock v. State (1915), 185
Ind. 51, 110 N. E. 212; Redman v. State (1820), 1 Blackf. 96; Lovell v. State
(1859), 12 Ind. 18; Hahn v. State (1914), 182 Ind. 1, 105 N. E. 385.
-Cross v. State (1894), 138 Ind. 254, 37 N. E. 790; Spears v. State (1897),
147 Ind. 51, 46 N. E. 301; Thompson v. State (1919), 189 Ind. 182, 125 N. E. 641;
Zimmerman v. State (1920), 190 Ind. 537, 130 N. E. 235.
